The English-language literature on the international expansion of banks from the Nordic countries does exist but is sparse and makes little mention of consortium banks. Flatraaker and Husevåg [1991] provide a descriptive history of the internationalization of the Norwegian banks and report that the Norwegian banks followed their customers. Vastrup [1983] examined the Danish banks and found that the primary motive for the Danish banks to go abroad too was to follow their customers. Engwall and Wallenstål [1988] provide an interesting account of the strategic behavior of Swedish banks in their international expansion. They find that rivalrous behavior was an important factor in the Swedish banks' pattern of international investment. This paper is one of the few in the area of foreign direct investment (FDI) in banking to consider behavior. Marquardt's [1994] doctoral thesis (unfortunately available only in Swedish) provides a comprehensive discussion of the Swedish experience. Although Laakso [1984] reports that Finnish banks followed their customers, Hellman (1994) contests this view. Hellman argues that Finnish banks went to international financial centers in a market seeking mode rather than following their customers. Unfortunately, Hellman did not take into account the impact of host-country banking regulations or the Finnish banks' membership in consortia on the banks' behavior.
What appears to be distinctive about the international expansion of the Nordic banks was their heavy use of consortia that brought together banks from several countries into competing alliances. However, none of these alliances lasted long enough to provide a lifetime career for any employee.
The Nordic consortia should have been more resistant than most to the problems of joint ventures. They enjoyed multiple linkages over time and space. The same partnerships of banks from the Nordic countries established different consortia in different countries. These linkages could have acted to ameliorate conflicts by increasing the benefits of cooperation over opportunistic behavior. Still, none of the major Nordic consortia lasted even 25 years and most were shorter-lived than that.
In Section 2 we discuss the consortium phenomenon in general. In Section 3 we examine the experience of the Norwegian banks in particular. Section 4 is the conclusion. Five appendices examine the histories of the banks in detail. A sixth appendix explains our statistical methods.
Consortia: multi-parent joint ventures in banking
The 1960s and 1970s saw the formation of numerous international strategic alliances in banking that included most of the world's major banks. These took the form of banking clubs and consortium banks. The banking clubs such as EBIC, Europartners, Inter-Alpha, Orion, and SFE/ABECOR, were general agreements among sets of banks to cooperate with one another (Steuber 1977) . The clubs rarely included more than one bank from any individual country and the degree of cooperation ranged from an enhanced correspondent relationship to an attempt to move towards a quasi-merger. In some cases the clubs gave rise to specific consortium banks.
Consortium banks are banks owned by several parent banks. Generally none of the parents owns a majority position and non-bank shareholders are also rare. Still, exceptions to both these tendencies have occurred. Dow Scandia (see below)
provides an example of a consortium in which one of the four partners, a bank subsidiary of a chemical company, held a majority of the shares.
Consortia brought together small groups of shareholder banks to engage in some banking activity that the shareholders themselves did not engage in directly.
Examples of such activities included project finance, long-term lending, or credit to particular parts of the world. Some early consortia, especially the Nordic ones were simply vehicles for the conduct of international banking in financial centers such as Ganoe [1972] estimates that of the 50 largest banks in the world in 1971, all but 5
were members of consortia. Furthermore, 75% were truly involved in the memberships; the rest had only minor interests. Brosset [1983] reports that the formation of joint ventures and consortia peaked in 1973-4. He lists some 280 organizations in 1980, but at least 37 by that time no longer had multiple parents.
The Bank of England (1993) reported another wave of cross-border alliances in the European Community around 1990 but this has involved few joint ventures or consortia.
The scholarly literature, empirical or theoretical, on the banking consortia is almost nil. Fenema [1982; 164-173 ] devotes a few pages to the phenomenon and notes the pattern of coalitions with "enemies of [one's] enemies' friends." Aronson's [1976] article looks at consortia from the point of view of their implications for the relations between multinational companies and governments and does not deal with the consortia as examples of a business strategy. Still, the consortia are subject to many of the same managerial difficulties as other joint ventures and the literature on other kinds of joint ventures is frequently applicable.
The one recent article on strategic alliances versus wholly-owned ventures as the mode for diversification in financial services looks at product diversification within a country. Ingham and Thompson (1994) examine empirically the determinants of UK building societies' choices following deregulation in 1987. They find that firms with specific assets prefer wholly-owned ventures but that alliances are a means of dealing with resource constraints and risk, and also reflect some remaining regulatory requirements.
Kogut [1988] classifies the theories seeking to explain joint ventures into three groups: the organizational learning approach, the transactions costs approach, and the strategic motivations approach. All three have something to contribute but the strategic motivations approach appears to be the most useful in the case of the Nordic consortia. The strategic motivations approach appears to be the most useful for our purposes because it accounts for the choice of partner. The Nordic banking consortia permitted subsets of banks to combine forces to accomplish certain tasks and to improve their positioning vis-à-vis other subsets. The groupings represented rival pan-Nordic alliances that served to limit competition within each of the Nordic countries but enabled competition to take place in outside markets.
Banking consortia avoid problems with transfer prices or relationships with suppliers that joint ventures in manufacturing face. Still, banking consortia cannot escape disagreements among the partners over market strategy and dividend policy.
The most fundamental problem facing all joint ventures is that of aligning the return to the partners with their respective contributions. Robinson [1969] has an early and insightful discussion of the issues.
Joint ventures in manufacturing usually involve two partners and only rarely more. Banking consortia almost always involved multiple partners. A listing of 29
"multibanks" in 1971 showed only two with two owners (one case of 50-50 partnership and one case of 98-2 partnership) and 22 cases of more than four partners [von Clemm 1971] . Brosset [1983] reports that as of 1982, 50% of the ventures had four or fewer partners (though only 16% had only two), 37.5% had from 5 to 10 partners, and 12.5% had more than 10 partners.
Casual empiricism would suggest that there were three broad types of consortia:
those with widely dispersed ownership; those with concentrated but uneven ownership; and those with concentrated, equal ownership. One can hypothesize many relationships between ownership structure and the viability of a consortium.
With widely dispersed ownership, all the partners may see the venture as a portfolio investment. Then none will contribute resources beyond the initial capital.
In such consortia returns to equity are commensurate with the each partner's contribution; therefore the venture should escape disputes over perceived mismatches between contribution and return.
In consortia with concentrated ownership, possible pathologies range from expropriation of the minor owners (uneven ownership) to deadlock (equal ownership). Even short of pathological extremes, partners that are providing access to customers in excess of their shareholding will resent a profit distribution based only on equity positions. The partners can (and did --see below) adjust their shareholdings periodically but this would raise the specter of domination by one partner and the negotiations themselves could be contentious. (Blodgett (1996) shows that among manufacturing joint ventures a history of contract renegotiation correlates positively with subsequent dissolution of the ventures.) These problems suggest that consortia with concentrated ownership should be relatively short-lived. Nakamura et al., (1996) , in their examination of manufacturing joint ventures, find that when the parents of a joint venture converge in their organizational skills, this tends to lead to a dissolution of the venture. Stability appears to require that the parents specialize in complementary organizational skills. In banking it is hard to see how such a divergent evolution might come about.
In the Nordic alliance involving Bergen Bank (Appendix 2) a closer cooperation evolved as the partners learned to work with each other (Doz 1996) . However, even here the alliance fell apart after the environment changed to freer competition.
von Clemm [1971] and Ganoe [1972] have the earliest and almost the only articles describing the rise of consortium banking; shortly after the first consortia began, von Clemm and Ganoe were already observing managerial problems. Ganoe forecast that few would survive unchanged. von Clemm, however, suggested that "[in] 20 years the listing of the 100 largest banks of the world should contain the names of some banks being spawned in today's consortium movement, some of which will have displaced their founders in the listings." He was completely wrong.
Twenty years later, almost all the consortia had disappeared and the survivors were small and specialized [Coakley 1992 ].
By the end of the decade, Davis [1979] was forecasting that "[There] will be a continuation of the recent trend away from consortia and joint ventures. While a few such organizations will be set up de novo to exploit fairly specific, well-defined market opportunities, a more powerful trend will be the weakening of cooperation among partners of existing multi-bank ventures and the actual dissolution or restructuring of several of them."
The experience of the Norwegian banks
The Nordic banks, including the Norwegians, established two clubs and generally used consortia and joint-ventures for their international expansion. The
Nordic consortia appear to have included some specialized or focused institutions. For most of the postwar era, Den norske Creditbank (DnC), Christiania Bank og Kreditkasse (CBK) and Bergen Bank (BB), were the three largest Norwegian banks.
These three banks were responsible for most of the international expansion by Norwegian banks. As Table 1 Geographically, the Norwegian banks expanded first to Europe, then to
America and lastly to Asia [Flatraaker and Husevåg 1991] . From 1975 to 1990, Europe always accounted for the bulk of the banks' activities. Table 2 shows how DnC, BB and CBK used consortia to expand over time and space. We have drawn the banking centers for the table from Choi et al., [1986 and 1996] , and have used tests based on the hypergeometric distribution and Friedman's non-parametric rank test to enable us to make some inferences about the data in the we have drawn from Rose and Ito [1996] ).
Despite the visual impression, the hypergeometric test does not enable us to reject the null hypothesis that each of the three banks, taken pairwise, did not meet more often, i.e., operate in the same center, than one would expect by chance. If anything, they met slightly less often (Table 3; 
col. 2). This is curious because New
York and London are so important as centers for international banking that a presence there is almost obligatory for any bank with international pretensions. If we divide the centers into two types, centers in which the banks had to be and those in which they did not, the overall tendency to avoidance suggests that in the centers where the banks did not have to be the banks avoided each other quite strongly.
Unfortunately the number of observations is too sparse for meaningful statistical testing on subsets of the centers.
For most of the period DnC had the reputation of being the most aggressive of the three in terms of its international expansion; it certainly had the largest share of the Norwegian banks' foreign assets. CBK had the reputation of being the most conservative and had only a limited international network. BB appeared to follow DnC's lead, but at a slower pace. However, the Friedman test, again on pairwise comparisons in the five markets in which each pair met, does not enable us to reject the null hypothesis that none of the three was more likely to enter before any of the others (Table 3 ; Col. 3). Although DnC entered four out of five markets before CBK, it would have had to have led in all five for the statistics to show an effect that was statistically significant at the conventional 5% significance level.
Regulation was arguably an important factor in the Norwegian banks choosing to use consortia. Until 1985, Norwegian law and regulations prohibited banks from using the branch or agency organizational form for their international expansion.
The only forms open to the banks were representative offices, subsidiaries and participation in joint ventures and banking consortia.
By forcing the banks to use subsidiaries, the regulations may have forced the banks to seek partners to spread the costs of operating a subsidiary. Bankers have long argued that they prefer branches to subsidiaries as a branch does not require additional capital and has lower administrative costs [Olsson 1986] . A subsidiary brings with it sunk costs in the form of costs of incorporation and ongoing costs in the form of annual reports to registries of corporations. This larger investment perhaps may have forced the parent banks to seek partners that could both share the investment and provide enough business to enable the new venture to achieve critical mass. Arguably, the restrictions in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden on entry by foreign banks forced and facilitated international cooperation. Barred from entering the nearest, most logical markets in which to operate, the Nordic banks had to go farther afield. Given the evidence that trade falls off with distance, the prohibitions may have reduced the trade-related business that each of the banks could expect to find, reducing the probability that any bank would be able to justify assuming the entire fixed costs of an overseas subsidiary.
Partnering with banks from different countries may also have helped to spread and diversify the risks that are inherent when a bank from a small country operates a subsidiary. For banks from small countries the range of industries that their customers span is also small. When the banks follow their domestic customers' business abroad, this gives the banks' foreign operations concentrated loan portfolios. This is not a problem for a branch as a branch is legally part of its parent company. A concentrated portfolio can be a problem for a subsidiary because a subsidiary is a separate legal entity. A concentrated portfolio means that a subsidiary may fail when the industry to which it lends runs into difficulty whereas a branch would not.
More importantly, the inability to compete in each other's domestic markets may have freed the banks to cooperate abroad. As Fenema [1982] points out, consortia generally suffer from a Prisoner's Dilemma: being potential competitors, the members continually are tempted to engage in parasitic behavior. The governmental restrictions on home-market entry removed the most obvious conflict.
All these factors dissipated over time. In numerous cases, it is clear that by the 1980s several of the parents in a consortium could each reasonably expect to be able to maintain an operation based only on the clients it brought. Also in the mid to late 1980s, the regulatory authorities began to permit their banks to use the branches abroad in addition to or instead of subsidiaries; for instance in 1985, the Norwegian government authorized the Norwegian banks to establish branches overseas. Plus, the inducement to establish operations abroad to avoid domestic regulations lost whatever force it had as home governments deregulated. Our results on the competition between the banks stand in some contrast to those of Engwall and Wallenstål [1988] , Ito and Rose [1994] , and Rose and Ito [1996] .
Our results suggest a more complex set of behaviors than a simple "tit-for-tat" or "follow-the-leader" strategy. There are some locations the banks have to go to such as London or New York because of the importance of these as central marketplaces [Choi et al., 1986 and 
Appendix 1: Den norske Creditbank (DnC)
Though DnC was the largest Norwegian bank, it was only a small force internationally. In 1969, DnC ranked 302nd on a list of the largest banks in the world, behind five Swedish, three Danish, and two Finnish banks.
Of all the Norwegian banks, Den norske Creditbank was probably the most outward looking. Prior to 1987, DnC had more total assets abroad than the other Norwegian banks combined. DnC reports that in going abroad it followed its
Norwegian corporate clients (DnC 1982).
In 1957, DnC's main international business consisted of processing international payments through its network of correspondent banks. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the bank also increased its lending in foreign currency. The bank provided foreign currency loans to its larger customers, especially in industry and shipping [Melander 1978 ].
In the mid-1960s, DnC started to participate in several finance companies designed to help foreign businesses in the less developed parts of the world. NABC provided the partners with access to US dollars outside the Euro-market.
In its commercial lending, the Nordic American Bank Corporation catered primarily to Norwegian corporations, especially in the oil business.
In 1985 The Scandinavian Banking Partners had as their goal to "ensure that the partner banks' customers in the Nordic area were provided with services of a quality equal to that which would have been achieved had the banks operated in their own home markets" [Flatraaker and Husevåg 1991] . The partners stated that they would acquire shares in each other's banks. The Swedish prohibition on the acquisition by foreign banks of shares in Swedish banks delayed the full interchange of shares.
Still, by 1987, all but the Danes had bought shares in each other (Table 6 ). The partners further agreed to cooperate in various areas, to refrain from opening subsidiaries or branches in each other's countries, and to carry out joint operations abroad, including joint representative offices. SBP thus appears to have been an attempt to counteract the divisive effect of the now imminent deregulation of entry.
The decision to exchange shares represents an example of what Perotti (1992) has called a hostage exchange to support collaboration. His model envisions the participating firms exchanging sufficient shares to establish a mutual threat of capture of control; each firm then may make a credible commitment to future efficient cooperative actions and so in equilibrium no punishment is administered.
From Table 5 it is clear that the partners did not establish a mutual threat of capture of control. It should not be surprising therefore to discover that the partners were not able to enforce cooperation in the face of fissiparous forces.
Scandinavian Banking Partners provides the clearest example in our data of Doz's (1996) model of cycles of learning, reevaluation, and readjustment among the Nordic consortia. Learning reinforced the positive assessment of the alliance and led the partners to make further commitments to the alliance, enlarging its scope and its stakes. However, the partners were already co-specialized in that each specialized in its own domestic market; when the respective governments removed the barriers to cross-investment any change could only take the form of interpenetration. In 1986, PK-banken and CBK mutually agreed to dissolve their partnership [Eek 1992 ]. PK-banken took over CBK's 50% stake in the Hong Kong subsidiary, while CBK took over PK's half-share in the Singapore and London subsidiaries.
As a result of the bank crisis, in 1991 the government came to own CBK completely. The crisis forced CBK to reduce the international division drastically.
Three of CBK's early participations in other banks had survived into the 1990s:
Banque Transatlantique SA, Algemene Bank Nederland (Schweiz) and Finanzierungsgesellschaft Viking. CBK decided that as a matter of policy it would own 100% of its subsidiaries or withdraw [Eek 1992 ] and sold all but its 13.5% stake in Finanzierungsgesellschaft Viking. where g is the Friedman test statistic, a is the number of countries in which both firms invest, and T j , j = 1,2 is the sum of the ranks for the jth firm. 
